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THE LAW OF PARODY-INFRINGEMENTt
Raymond T. Nimmer*
INTRODUCTION
An interesting but infrequently litigated copyright law question is
presented in situations involving an unauthorized parody of a copy-
righted work. The few court decisions on this subject offer uncertain and
unsatisfactory rationales and solutions to the problem. Likewise, the
various articles appearing in legal journals fail to advance a satisfactory
resolution. It is suggested that these shortcomings result from an initial
failure to fully take into account the intrinsic character of the work that
is described as a parody and the nature of the exclusive right that is
sought to be enforced against it. This paper seeks to suggest the factors
and issues that become relevant when these characteristics are recognized.
PARODIES
In order to fully understand the problem it is necessary both to
recognize the common definition of "parody" and to become acquainted
with the manner in which parodies are created in our modern society.
Webster defines "parody" as a "writing in which the language
and style of the author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in
ridicule often with certain peculiarities greatly heightened or exagger-
ated."1 Legal authorities dealing with the parody-infringement problem
have preferred, however, to include within the scope of their consideration
those parody-like efforts that do not involve a written work.' Thus, they
have appropriately included those activities that are technically classifi-
able as burlesque.' This paper adopts a similar approach.
Parody has produced a number of notable and memorable works.
For example, recognized masterpieces such as Chaucer's Ryme of Sir
t This paper is a revision of an essay that was awarded the Fifth National Prize
in the 1967 Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition. It is published with
the permission of the American Society of Composers and Publishers, the sponsors of
the essay competition.
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33
CAN. B. REv. 1130 (1955) ; and Crossland, Rise and Fall of Fair Use: The Protection
of Literary Materials Against Copyright Infringement by New and Developing Media,
20 S. CAR. L. REV. 153 (1968).
3. Burlesque is also defined as including literary compositions. The primary
distinction between the two "art" forms seems to be that burlesque involves "grotesque
exaggeration or comic imitation" whereas parody merely involves exaggeration of
certain peculiarities. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 299 (1961).
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Thopas and Gay's Beggar's Opera were actually parodies that have
enjoyed far greater recognition than the originals.' Clearly, in this
traditional guise, parody commands recognition as a distinct art form.
However, in our modern society, works alleged to be parodies may
be produced in situations bearing little relationship to the traditional
form. This modern phenomenon may be illustrated by reference to the
following hypothetical fact situation. Assume that Mr. A. A. Writer is
the author of a financially successful novel entitled, "Apocalypes." Critics
acclaim this novel as the supreme literary achievement of the con-
temporary age.
One year after the publication of Mr. Writer's novel, Mr. B. G.
Clown, a television comedian, decides to base his weekly television show
on Mr. Writer's story. To this end, Mr. Clown develops an hour-long
comical sketch, borrowing substantially from Mr. Writer's novel. The
sketch is videotaped and scheduled for national showing. Mr. Writer,
however, learns of Mr. Clown's activity and brings an action to enjoin
the use of material from his novel. Mr. Clown asserts as a defense that
he is entitled to use portions of the novel because his sketch is a parody
of the novel.
As Mr. Clown prepared his sketch, Mr. Writer's novel received
attention from a second source. Mr. I. M. Paradee, a well-known literary
critic, began preparation of his first novel entitled "A Pack of Lips."
Mr. Paradee abhors the state of contemporary literature. He wishes to
express, through parody, his displeasure with contemporary literary
styles and trends. To this end, Mr. Paradee has taken a substantial
portion of Mr. Writer's novel and so twisted the events and characters
as to call attention to the absurdities of modern writing styles. Mr.
Writer learns of Mr. Paradee's novel and brings an action to prevent its
publication. Mr. Paradee defends the action by claiming that his novel
is merely a parody of Mr. Writer's novel.
The inherently different characteristics of the parody-like works
that precipitated these two hypothetical lawsuits is clear. Mr. Paradee's
novel closely resembles the traditional art form of parody and might be
described as "true parody." Mr. Clown's sketch, on the other hand, takes
the form of merely another product of the mass entertainment business.
For our purposes it might be labeled as an illustration of a "comic
adaptation for profit." Recognition of the factual differences between
these two polar positions as well as among the various efforts falling
4. See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque it the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN.
B. REv. 1130, 1131 (1955). See generally KITCHEN, SURVEY OF BURLESQUE AND
PARODY IN ENGLISH (1931).
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between these extremes is essential to a proper analysis of the parody-
infringement problem.
COPYRIGHT LAW IN GENERAL
At this point the reader may reasonably inquire why examples of
even "true parody" should not be treated in the same manner as other
examples of borrowing under the copyright law. Indeed, this issue has
proved to be a basic controversy in this area.' The argument for a more
favorable position for parody is based upon the Constitutional mandate
for the creation of a copyright law. Congressional power to enact such a
law is granted for the express purpose of promoting the Arts and
Sciences.6 The familiar monopoly that has been granted to authors is
merely a means chosen to accomplish this end.' However, to be effective,
the parodist must be free to copy a substantial amount of the original
and to adapt this copied material to a comical treatment.' Thus, the
argument concludes, to bar the parodist from copying substantially would
be a perversion of the Constitutional mandate in that it would work to
deter rather than to promote a recognized art form.
However, it should be recognized that, even in situations involving
ordinary copying, the statutory monopoly granted to an author has not
been construed as being absolute.' The courts have added a number of
conditions and qualifications upon the author's exclusive right. Among
these qualifications are the doctrines of substantial appropriation and
fair use.
The Doctrine of Substantial Appropriation
Chafee attributes the development of the substantial appropriation
concept to the Constitutional mandate." The doctrine is apparently a
recognition of the fact that the development of the Arts and Sciences
would be substantially impeded if all copying were held to be an in-
fringement."
5. But see Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944)
(written compositions that parodied the lyrics of the original, infringement found,
issue of parody as fair use unlitigated).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1964).
8. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REv. 1130, 1131 (1955).
9. See generally H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
(1944) and KAPLAN & BROWN, COPYRIGHT (1960).
10. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUm. L. Rzv. 503, 511
(1945).
11. Id. It has been suggested that the doctrine developed from the equity practice of
denying relief under the de minimus doctrine. See Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright
Infringement, 9 A.S.C.A.P. 1, 9 (1958). See also Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright
Protection, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1125 (1951).
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A detailed exposition of the factors included in the concept of sub-
stantial appropriation is beyond the scope of this paper. The effect of
the doctrine is that there is no infringement unless the copying consti-
tutes what the court considers to be a substantial amount of the original.'"
The tests used to determine if a particular appropriation is sub-
stantial can be best summarized by saying that the final determination
rests upon a pragmatic analysis of the facts in each case. However, in
view of the importance of this doctrine in relation to the problem of
parody-infringement, a summary of the tests is appropriate."3
The term "substantial" connotes a weighing of the amount used.
This is the approach used by the courts applying the "quantity" test.
In effect, the court determines the percentage of the original that has
been copied. Once the court determines this percentage, it decides whether
this percentage constitutes a substantial portion of the original. 4 The
inadequacies of this test are apparent. No account is taken of the over-all
effect of the portion copied. No provision is made for the situation in
which the portion copied, though small, is enough to effectively reproduce
the original.'"
In contrast to this rigid test are two tests involving a greater degree
of subjective determination. The first purports to base the finding of
substantiality upon the "quality" of the section copied.'6 Courts applying
this test apparently attempt to determine whether the copied sections are
vital to the total effect of the copyrighted work.
The second "subjective" test may be called the "impartial observer
test."1 Application of this test varies depending upon the individual
judge's conceptualization of an impartial observer. The court must deter-
mine whether, upon first reading the alleged copy, an impartial observer
would immediately associate the reproduction with *he original.
There are numerous other tests of substantiality, including: 1)
the taking is substantial if the taker intended to copy the original;"8
2) the taking is not substantial if the taker has imparted a high degree
12. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 334 (1944).
See also Chafee, supra note 10, at 511.
13. As illustrated in the summary of the case law, the courts have placed great
emphasis upon this issue in dealing with the parody-infringement problem. See notes
48-73 infra and accompanying text.
14. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287, 288 (C.C. N.Y. 1909).
15. H. BALL, supra note 12, at 334-35. Rossett states that this test originated in
the equity-law dichotomy and should no longer be valid since a court now may order
either damages or an injunction. Rossett, supra note 11, at 12.
16. Ansehl v. Puritan Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1937); Toksvig v. Bruce
Pub]. Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
17. See Funhauser v. Loew's, 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1954); Universal Pictures,
Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Co., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
18. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1968], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss1/3
38 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of originality to his final product;19 3) a finding of substantial appro-
priation is made if the reproduction materially reduces the demand for
the original work;2" and 4) the court views the appropriation in a
stricter manner if it were made with profit motives.2
The Doctrine of Fair Use
Another qualification of an author's right to control reproduction
of his work is the doctrine of fair use. Fair use is codified in the English
copyright statute under the title "fair dealing,"22 but it is solely judge-
made law in the United States. The doctrine of fair use allows copying
from a copyrighted work if such appropriation is "customary and reason-
ably expected."2 This definition is misleadingly simple, for the doctrine
of fair use is the most troublesome issue in copyright law.2 No easily-
applied criteria exist. The determination of fair use is purely a case-by-
case exercise in pragmatics."
The doctrine of fair use is applied to protect limited copying of
scientific works and methods.2 In this area, the reasons for the doctrine
are similar to those which dictated the adoption of the substantial
appropriation requirement-allowance for the rapid development of the
sciences through limited copying."
The doctrine of fair use also applies to reviews and literary
criticisms.2" Traditionally, the courts have held that the reviewer has
a right to quote material from the original to illustrate the comments
that he makes. He is not, however, allowed to quote so extensively as
to supersede the original or to substitute for it.2"
The doctrine of fair use involves too many complex issues to permit
detailed discussion in this paper. It must suffice to re-emphasize that the
determination of fair use is a pragmatic decision. There are, however,
certain suggested guidelines such as: the value of the parts appropriated;
the value in relation to the works in controversy; the purpose served by
each work; and the extent of interference with the sale of the original."
19. Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., 1 Ch. 261, 268 (1916).
20. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Co., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
21. Witmark & Sons v. Passtime Amusement Co., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
22. Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46, § 2(1) (i).
23. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
24. See Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CnI. L. REv. 203 (1954). For a
comprehensive discussion of the fair use doctrine see Crossland, supra note 2. See
also Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
25. Carr v. National Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
26. Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
27. Id. at 103.
28. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
29. Id. at 30.
30. Carr v. National Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1934). Crossland
suggests and discusses nine elements to the doctrine. Crossland, supra note 2, at 183.
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It is apparent, upon comparing the tests and the guidelines mentioned
above, that substantiality and fair use are closely related theories. Each
doctrine is applied through flexible case-by-case determinations. There
is no need to be bound by rigid classifications or rules in determining
whether a specific work infringes a copyright.
CONFLICT BETWEEN PARODY AND COPYRIGHT
Introduction
The rights of the holder of a copyright conflict with the practice of
the art of parody. The copyright holder is entitled to the exclusive right
to control reproduction of his material, but the parodist must use a large
amount of the original in order to develop an effective parody." This
conflict is not resolved by the present copyright statute. 2 Resolution of
the problem is, therefore, the responsibility of the courts.
The few reported cases considering the parody-infringement pro-
blem fail to reach the underlying issues." There is no recognition that
the problem requires a complex balancing of the proper interests. Fur-
ther, the functional distinction between true parody and "comic adapta-
tion" is not observed. Instead, the courts indiscriminately apply the
theories of general copyright law to all works that nominally fall within
the dictionary definition of "parody." The result is that "true parody"
is made subject to the unpredictable tests of copyright law. 4 On the
other hand, comic adaptation is afforded the benefit of association with an
ancient form of art. This benefit is clearly unwarranted in view of the
commercial nature of "comic adaptation."
Decisional Law
English Cases
English copyright law is generally similar to American law.3
The primary English copyright statute, however, points up one differ-
ence: the doctrine of "fair use" is given express legislative sanction
under the name "fair dealing.""
31. This has been recognized in some of the cases considering the parody-
infringement problem. These courts permit the parodist to copy enough material to
conjure up the original in the mind of the viewer. See note 68 infra and accompanying
text.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1964).
33. See notes 37-74 supra and accompanying text.
34. As is emphasized lately, not only are these tests unpredictable but, more
importantly, they involve irrelevant considerations. See notes 73-74 infra and accom-
panying text.
35. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv.
1130, 1138 (1955).
36. 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46, § 2(1) (i).
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One of the leading English cases connected with the problem of
parody-infringement is Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace Ltd." This case
does not specifically consider the parody-infringement problem, but deals
with rough illustrative sketches of works of art. The plaintiff held the
copyright to certain pictures which were being presented in the form of
tableaux vivant. During a public exhibition of these works newspaper
reporters made rough sketches of the original pictures. The sketches
were used solely for illustrative purposes in connection with articles
concerning the tableaux.
The Chancery court found that this did not constitute an actionable
infringement. 8 The several opinions indicate that the court believed
there could be no infringement because the nature of the sketches was
different from the original. The opinion of Lopes, L.J., is representative:
"[T]he sketches may be described as rough, rude drawings, devoid of
artistic merit; there is no attempt to reproduce the merits of the original-
no attempt at art .... It is a work of a different class, intended for a
different purpose. . .. ""
In Francis, Day & Hunter v. Feldman,"0 the Chancery court dealt
with a situation somewhat more analogous to that of parody-infringe-
ment. Here the alleged infringement took the form of a satirical answer
to a popular song. The infringement claim was summarily disposed of
by holding that the reply song was not a colorable imitation of the
original.
Carlton v. Mortimer 1 dealt with an alleged infringement of the
copyright to a Tarzan novel. The defendant was a member of an acro-
batic team that operated under the name of "Warzan and His Apes."
The acrobats used two situations from the novel in their performances.
The court found no infringement because the two situations were taken
merely as a burlesque of the original novel. While not exonerating all
burlesque from the restrictions. of the copyright act, the court felt that,
since there had been a complete inversion of moods in the two copied
situations, there was no infringement in this situation.
Perhaps the most liberal treatment of parody under the copyright
laws can be found in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co."2 In this case,
the court dealt with a copyright of a vulgar, best-selling English novel
entitled "Three Weeks." The alleged infringement occurred in a movie,
37. 3 Ch. 109 (1894).
38. Id. at 132.
39. Id.
40. 2 Ch. 728 (1914).
41. MAGGILLIVRAY, COPYRIGHT CASES 194 (1917-23), as quoted in Yankwich,
supra note 35, at 1132.
42. 1 Ch. 261 (1916).
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equally vulgar, albeit farcical, and admittedly based upon the novel.
In the arguments of counsel, each side treated the issue of the
desirability of applying an exemption to the copyright laws in the case of
a parody or burlesque. The court did not reach this issue, however,
having found that the novel was too vulgar to be entitled to protection
under the copyright laws."3
After deciding the case on the vulgarity issue, the court stated that
the copyright holder would not have prevailed even if the novel were not
vulgar. After discussing the lack of decisions dealing with the parody-
infringement problem, the court stated its allegiance to the principle that
no infringement takes place when the defendant uses "such mental labor
on what he has taken and has made such revision and alteration as would
produce an original result."" As indicated in a later case, the court felt
that there could never be an infringement in the case of a parody.45
Except for the dicta of the Glyn case, no English case specifically
treats the parody-infringement problem. Some writers find, however, a
basis from which there could be implied a doctrine whereby parody
would be treated with a special form of leniency. 6
Early American Decisions
American precedent considering the parody-infringement problem
may be divided into two time periods. Early cases dealt with situations
in which the copying was motivated solely in order to profit financially
from the work, style or mannerisms of another person. Later decisions,
however, have expressed doubt as to the efficacy of the early decisions
as precedent for the parody-infringement problem in the context in
which the problem is presented in this paper.
The first American case to consider the parody-infringement prob-
lem is Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon.48 The defendant toured the country
with an act in which she impersonated public figures. The alleged in-
fringement occurred when, in the course of her act, the defendant sang
a chorus of a copyrighted song in the style of a named singer.
The court found that this did not constitute an infringement of the
copyrighted song." The defendant did not actually perform the song
but merely used it as a vehicle for her imitations. The court stressed
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 268.
45. MAGGILLWVRAY, supra note 41, at 194.
46. See Note, 12 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959). Rossett notes, however, that the
English text, COPINGER & SKONE-JONEs, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (8th ed. 1948), treats
parody "with the same rules as all other uses." Rossett, supra note 15, at 24 n.74.
47. Berlin v. E.C. Publ., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
48. 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
49. Id. at 978.
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that the defendant sang the song in good faith and with no intent to
copy. It should be noted that the Nixon court did not state that the
defendant's acts constituted a parody of the copyrighted work. Thus, later
courts using this decision as precedent in disposing of the parody-
infringement problem have necessarily formulated their own conception
of what constitutes a parody."0 It is not surprising, therefore, that a
contemporary decision has asserted that the Nixon case does not even
concern a parody. The reason for this confusion is that Nixon deals with
a peculiarly modern phenomenon of non-original, mass entertainment in
which a portion of the original work is taken, not to criticize the original
nor to create an entirely new work, but simply to give a paying audience
the entertainment for which the actor receives his compensation. As
such, the activity considered in Nixon more resembles an ordinary com-
mercial endeavor than an independent art form.
The Nixon case was followed six years later by Green v. Min-
zenheimer." The defendant in Minzenheimer was also a professional im-
personator. The copyrighted song was delivered without accompaniment.
The court found that there was no infringement since the song was
merely a vehicle for the impersonation.
The test used in Nixon and Minzenheimer was clarified in Green v.
Luby." In this case, the defendant used the entire song as part of a
dramatic sketch. He claimed that he sang the song only for mimicry
value, stating that "the mimicry is the important thing; the particular
song, the mere incident. '
'
.
3
The court distinguished Minzenheimer and Nixon saying that the
appropriation in those cases was far less than the entire song. The court
could not believe that it was necessary to sing the entire song to mimic
a singer and held that there had been an infringement. 4
The Luby case uses a test analogous to the general test of sub-
stantial appropriation. It is to be noted that the defendant in Luby
was a professional entertainer. His activities, as were those of the
defendants in Nixon and Minzenheimer, are properly included within the
category of "comic adaptation for profit." This series of cases, therefore,
supports the idea of applying the substantial appropriation test to situa-
tions in which the defendant appropriates for commercial use, regardless
of the nominal categorization of the appropriation as a "parody."
One other early case merits discussion. In Hill v. Whalen &
50. 329 F.2d at 544.
51. 177 F. 286 (S.D. N.Y. 1907).
52. 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
53. Id. at 288.
54. Id.
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Martel, Inc.,55 the court considered an alleged reproduction of the
cartoon characters, "Mutt" and "Jeff." The "parody" took the form of a
dramatic performance in which characters named "Nutt" and "Griff,"
who closely resembled the copyrighted characters, appeared. The defen-
dant claimed that the copying was justified because it was a parody of
the original.
In finding an infringement, the court based its reasoning upon two
factors. Initially, it emphasized that there had been a substantial reduction
in demand for the original. The court also mentioned that the defendants
had copied in bad faith. The court said that "'In Cartoonland' was
calculated to injuriously affect .. . the value of the complainant's copy-
right."5
In holding that "bad faith" defeated defendant's asserted defense,
the court implicitly held that good faith was essential to the defense of
parody. Good faith requires that the "parodist" does not intend to
reduce the value of the original.
In sum, the early American cases make no express distinction be-
tween a "comic adaptation" for monetary gain and a "true parody."
It is to be noted, however, that, with the possible exception of the Hill
case, all of the early cases dealt with commercial rather than artistically
oriented work. This confined nature of the subject matter may explain
the failure to recognize the suggested distinction.
Contemporary American Cases
Three contemporary cases consider the parody-infringement pro-
blem. They may be divided into two categories-the first dealing with
the relatively modern mass entertainment medium of television and the
second with the problem through the comparatively old medium of
satirical journalism.
Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems Inc.,5" involved a
burlesque of the copyrighted motion picture "Gaslight." Shortly after
the release of the motion picture, comedian Jack Benny performed a
burlesque of the movie on radio. Six years later he repeated the burlesque
on television. The holders of the copyright to the motion picture objected
to the latter performance. Upon learning that Benny contemplated film-
ing a full-length burlesque of the movie, the copyright owners sued for an
injunction.
In comparing the contemplated television copy and the original,
55. 220 F. 359 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
56. Id. at 360. See Note, The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters,
68 HARV. L. REv. 349 (1954).
57. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956).
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the trial court found that the locale, setting, characters, points of suspense
and treatment were all almost identical. The issue, therefore, was wheth-
er "a burlesque, which takes a substantial part of a copyrighted motion
picture, is a fair use." 8 Thus viewed, the "Gaslight" case presented, for
the first time, the question of whether parody would be accorded a
position of favor under the copyright laws.
The court found an infringement on the ground that Benny's
"parody" constituted a substantial taking in a manner which was not a
fair use. The court cited numerous authorities on the definition of
"fair use" in an attempt to break the doctrine into component parts.
Application of the doctrine of fair use to the partial appropriation of
scientific works was also discussed. The court stated that this type of
copying is allowed in order to promote the Arts and Sciences. Applying
this facet of the fair use doctrine to the facts, the court mentioned that,
although consent to limited copying is implied in order to aid the develop-
ment of the Arts, the word "art" does not include a television program
produced for commercial gain."
The court then addressed itself to criticism, a second facet of the
fair use doctrine. Equating parody to criticism is a familiar argument to
support preferential treatment for parody. The court recognized that
reviewers and critics are allowed to quote extensively from the original
for illustrative purposes; however, the court did not believe that the
activities of a television comedian could properly be called criticism. °
Having found that Benny's "parody" was neither a scientific work
nor a criticism, the court next considered the claim that parody is exempt-
ed under still another facet of the fair use doctrine. The defendant urged
the court to adopt the concept that parody itself was a defense. He
asserted that the application of ordinary copyright tests to parody would
sound the "death knell" for comedy. The court, however, citing the old
American cases, found that, although the defense of parody has been
raised in similar cases, no court had ever rested its decision solely upon
a finding that the appropriation was permissible because it was a parody.
Instead, the court found that "a parodized or burlesqued taking is
treated no differently from any other appropriation." 1
The court used two arguments to dispose of the defendant's con-
tention that it should recognize the defense of parody. Initially, the
court emphasized that the scope of fair use narrows as one moves
58. 131 F. Supp. 171.
59. Id. at 175. This conclusion appears to be more a result of personal judgment
than a result of objective analysis.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 177.
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farther away from the Arts and enters commercial areas. 2 The purpose
behind the use is important. The permissive scope is narrow when the
purpose for copying is commerical gain and broad when the secondary
work is intended for further learning. In the Loew's case the purpose for
copying was clearly commercial."3
With respect to the argument that the application of ordinary copy-
right tests would sound the "death knell" for parody, the court could
not foresee such far-reaching effects of the decision. An ample amount
of material in the public domain, it said, could serve as the basis for the
"art." Also, the court did not consider its holding an assault on literary
freedom, stating that it had "difficulty in visualizing the loss of the
freedom if Benny's activities are curtailed by this decision."64
On appeal, the Loew's case was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.6" Once again the defense of "parody" was re-
jected. The court did not elaborate on the doctrine of fair use. It did
mention, however, that there was no precedent supporting a doctrine
of fair use specifically applicable to situations in which the substance of
a dramatic work was copied and reproduced as a parody.6"
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of California
considered a second parody-infringement case." Once again, the alleged
infringement was a television "parody" of a popular motion picture.
In this case, the parody was entitled "From Here to Obscurity" and it
featured comedian Sid Caesar. The court held that there had been no
infringement. If found that the defendants' use of portions of the motion
picture, "From Here to Eternity," was limited to the amount necessary
to cause the viewer to "conjure up" the original. "8
The court gave no formal opinion but did mention certain principles
applicable to the parody-infringement problem. Two of these are per-
tinent. Since parody historically involved use of part of the original for
recall purposes, the court felt that some limited taking should be per-
mitted under the doctrine of fair use. Furthermore, the doctrine of fair
use would permit the parodist considerable freedom to copy so long as
the appropriation is not substantial. 9
62. Id. at 176.
63. Whether this commercial motivation, alone, is a sufficient basis upon which
to reject the parodist's defense is considered at notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text.
64. 131 F. Supp. at 185.
65. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
66. Id. at 536.
67. Columbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
68. Id. at 350.
69. Id. at 352. Compare the decisive effect of these rules to the balancing
approach of the suggested guidelines at notes 80-91 infra and accompanying text.
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In sum, the contemporary cases dealing with television parody
clearly establish that the claim of parody is not, per se, a defense. The
cases do illustrate, however, a reluctance to restrict parody to the level of
other copying. This reluctance takes the form of a concession which
allows the parodist to copy enough to "conjure up" the original.
The latest case to consider the problem of parody-infringement is
Berlin v. E. C. Publications,"0 the "Mad Magazine" case. The magazine,
noted for its satirical treatment of familiar subjects, printed the lyrics
to a number of satirical songs. Each song was accompanied by a notation
instructing the reader to sing the song to the tune of a popular com-
position. In twenty-five instances the composition referred to was one
of the plaintiff's copyrighted works. Other than the reference to plaintiff's
songs and the fact that the parodies were written in the same meter,
there was little correlation between the content of the compositions.
Noting the extreme disparities in content and theme, the court
expressed difficulty in ascertaining the manner in which the plaintiff
had been injured. Also, there appeared to be no threat of a reduction in
demand for plaintiff's originals and there was little difficulty in dif-
ferentiating between the original and the parody. In view of this dis-
parity and the lack of threatened injury, the court found it unnecessary
to review the applicability of the "substantiality" test used in Loew's.
The parodies involved in the Berlin case, the court felt, would not
constitute an infringement under even the most rigorous application of
the "substantiality" test.
71
Although its finding that the taking was insubstantial obviated the
necessity to consider the parody-infringement issue, the court briefly
expressed its thoughts on the subject. The Berlin court clearly recognized
the historical significance of the art of parody. It stated its belief that,
"As a general proposition . . . parody and satire are deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and
literary criticism. '7 2 Further, the court felt that a finding of infringe-
ment would be especially improper where the parodist does not use any
more of the original than is necessary to "recall or conjure up" the
original.
Summary of the Parody-Infringement Cases
None of the cases considered above faced the problem of parody-
infringement in the context of "true parody." The defendant in the
70. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
71. Id. at 545. Only a few key lines were copied from each song-presumably
for recall purposes.
72. Id.
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Hill case acted in bad faith, while in the other cases the parodies were
motivated by commercial desires. The Berlin case involved a parody
which closely resembled the traditional form of "true parody, ' 73 but the
finding that the taking in that case was not substantial precluded full
consideration of the problem.
The Loew's case approaches full recognition of the impact of
commercial motivations upon the question of parody-infringement. The
court squarely faced the parody-infringement problem in the context of a
"comic adaptation for profit." In rejecting the defendant's contention
that parody is its own defense, the court stressed the obvious commercial
characteristics of the parody. Recognizing the liberties accorded to other
forms of art, the court stated that the commercially-oriented work under
consideration could not be called "art." The parody was properly sub-
jected, therefore, to the tests of ordinary copyright law.
In spite of language to the contrary in the Loew's case, courts
generally do not recognize the impact of commercial motives upon the
parody-infringement problem. Instead, they rely upon the general tests
of copyright law, tempered by a vague notion that parody deserves
protection as an independent art form. This approach neither recognizes
the actual issues nor provides a clear indication of the permissible scope
within which the parodist may operate. The result is that some com-
mercial efforts receive the benefit of association with true parody while
the actual art of parody may, in fact, be retarded by the lack of a precisely
defined scope of liability.
SUGGESTED SOLUTION
Introduction
The parody-infringement problem is in need of a clarification of
issues. Existing case law lacks uniformity and is replete with acknowl-
edgements of uncertainty as to the proper resolution of the problem."4
Furthermore, the use of general copyright tests in an attempt to resolve
the parody-infringement question increases the confusion. These tests
condition the legal status of parody upon the determination of factors
having little relevance to the vital policy considerations involved in the
problem.
The following analysis is intended to focus attention upon the
factors that must be considered if a rational solution to the parody-
73. Satirical journalism is, perhaps, the oldest form in which parody appears.
See generally KITCHEN, SURVEY OF BURLESQUE AND PARODY IN ENGLISH (1931).
74. 329 F.2d at 544.
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infringement problem is to be found. 5 The suggested guidelines are, in
the final analysis, subject to pragmatic application. Accordingly, their
implementation may result in little substantive change from the results
achieved through the application of the equally pragmatic general copy-
right tests. Acceptance of the suggested guidelines will, however, enable
courts to make a meaningful assessment of the status of the individual
parody. Further, they will enable the parodist to assess the legal effect
of his activities without being subjected to the legal process.
Arguments Rejecting All Preference
Throughout history, parody has been a vital and recognized part
of literature. Many important works of art are parodies of long-forgotten
originals. Thus, it seems clear that parody qualifies as an independent
art form.
The advent of mass entertainment as a multi-million dollar business
has dramatically altered the nature of modern parody. Comedians such
as Jack Benny daily engage in money-making activities that resemble
"parody." The resemblance, however, is purely superficial. The modern
comedian is primarily interested in completing his contract and makes
little effort to contribute to the Arts. His motives are primarily com-
mercial and, accordingly, his activities are properly categorized with
other profit-seeking endeavors."
These considerations lead many writers to conclude that modern
parody no longer deserves the description "art." 7  Therefore, they
argue that all modern parodies must, per se, be classified as commercial
endeavors. This leads to the conclusion that parody should in no case
receive preferential treatment.
To the extent that this argument forecloses consideration of the
underlying essence of the individual parody, it is unacceptable. It is
clear that most, if not all, of the contemporary attempts at parody
involve commercial motivations. This, however, does not justify the
denial of a preference to those instances in which the "parody" does not
involve dominating commercial motivations. In the absence of a dom-
inating commercial motive there is no justification, in the Constitutional
purpose underlying the copyright laws, to deter advancement of the
75. Various articles have appeared attempting to suggest the proper resolution
of this problem. See, e.g., Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright,
33 CAN. B. REV. 1130 (1955) ; Hadl, Parody Lyrics-The "Mad" Magazine Case,
11 BULL. CR. Coc. 319 (1964); Mummery, Parody and Plagerism, 116 NEw L.J. 1651
(1966) ; Comment, 39 FORD. L. REV. 570 (1961).
76. See Columbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
77. See Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585 (1955).
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independent art form of parody. Such a deterrent, even if it affects only
one "artist" among thousands of "parodists," would be a perversion of
the Constitutional mandate.
It is argued that parody does not require free access to copy-
righted works. This claim is based upon the assertion that the parodist
may fully practice his art within the realm of works in the public
domain."8 This argument fails to recognize the importance of making
use of well-known contemporary works. To restrict the parodist to
relatively unfamiliar works would be to substantially retard the impact
of the parody and affect the value of the parody to the contemporary
society.
Arguments Advocating Total Freedom
Emphasizing the historical prominence of parody, many writers
arrive at the conclusion that "parody" should be freed from the restraints
of the copyright laws."9 In arguing for complete freedom, these writers
utilize the dictionary definition of "parody" and ignore the impact of
commercial motivations. Accordingly, their position is clearly too broad.
A Hollywood scriptwriter or a major television producer is clearly
restricted as to the amount of copyrighted material he may use without
authorization. This same restriction is applicable to many instances of
modern parody. A meaningful distinction cannot be drawn between
these individuals and the professional comedian. Each is engaged in a
commercial activity. Each, if allowed to copy without restriction, would
be using the work of another solely to advance his own financial interests.
Nevertheless, it has been urged that, since the comedian is engaged
in activities resembling parody, he should not be restricted by the copy-
right laws. Clearly, this position is an attempt to extend the historical
significance of parody beyond all reasonable bounds. Nominal association
with a traditional art form should not conceal the inherent similarities of
the comedian's work with other profit-seeking enterprises. Accordingly,
insofar as the "total freedom" advocates purport to exempt the activities
of professional entertainers, their position is unacceptable as an unwar-
ranted intrusion upon the rights of the copyright holder.
SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
Recognition of the Various Contributing Factors
The suggested dichotomy represented by the terms "comic adapta-
78. This position was urged by the lower court in the Loew's case.
79. See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REV. 1130 (1955). A similar, supportable argument is that the parodist should be free
so long as he imparts a sufficient degree of originality. See Rossett, Burlesque as
Copyright Infringement, 9 A.S.C.A.P. 1 (1958).
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tion" and "true parody" may be misleading. These terms are not
intended to represent the two ultimate categories into which all instances
of the parody-infringement problem fall. Rather, the "comic adaptation"
label refers to those instances in which the commercial motive factor is
dominant. Inasmuch as this factor is dispositive of the majority of
instances of the problem, there has been no need to emphasize the ad-
ditional factors until now.
The parody-infringement problem presents a situation involving a
direct confrontation of two distinct rights. On the one hand is the right
of the parodist to have material available upon which he may effectively
base his artistic endeavors. On the other hand is the right of the copy-
right holder to control the reproduction of his work.
Each of these rights is composed of numerous factors. Rational
resolution of the basic conflict between these rights requires an analysis
of the relative weight to be accorded to each of these elements in view of
the particular facts of the individual case."0 Because of its frequent
occurence, analysis of these individual factors will reveal that one of the
crucial determinations involves the dominance of the parodist's commer-
cial motives. However, other determinations are important and must also
be considered.
The "right" of the parodist to have freely available material is
dependent upon numerous factors, but only those that are relevant to the
conflict in question will be discussed.
Status of the Individual Parody as "Art"
The purpose of the copyright law is to promote advancement of
the Arts."1  This implies that copyright laws should not be construed so
as to operate as a deterrent to any art form. Accordingly, the position of
the parodist becomes stronger as his work approaches the status of "art."
The definition of "art" is elusive. Webster's dictionary suggests
that "art" indicates that there has been an application of taste and talent
in order to create beauty. 2 This definition is acceptable only to the
extent that it does not purport to base the determination of "art" upon
the actual existence of talent. Neither is the definition acceptable if it
requires an individual determination as to what constitutes beauty.
Clearly, such tests would be improper because they would place too high
a premium upon an appeal to popular taste.
The above-mentioned definition, however, does suggest two work-
80. Note the similarity of many of these factors to the "elements" of fair use as
identified by Crossland. See Crossland, supra note 2, at 183.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
82. WEBSTER'S COLUMBIA CONCISE DICnONARY 42 (1939).
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able factors upon which the determination of the status of the parody
depends. The first of these concerns the intention of the artist. In this
context, the intent referred to is an intention to create "beauty.""3
Clearly, this artistic intent is a necessary feature of any artistic endeavor
and may be contrasted with a primary intention to realize a monetary
benefit. The relative importance of this artistic intent must be considered
to be a material factor in the determination of the status of the individual
work.
The second factor suggested by the proposed definition is the
extent to which the parodist applies his own talent and taste to the
copied material. In essence, this factor involves a determination of the
extent of originality involved in the parody. Clearly, a person who
copies the work of another without attempting to make any substantial
contribution of his own has little basis on which to claim the status of
an artist."s
Effect on the Arts Generally
Even if the parody is artistic, it may be subjected to the repressive
effect of the copyright laws in order to promote the Arts in general.
Accordingly, the potential effect of the parody upon the artistic field is
an important factor in a resolution of the conflict between the parodist
and the copyright holder.
This impact upon the Arts may be viewed as involving two distinct
considerations. Initially, the effect of permitting the parodist to circulate
his work must be considered. This, in turn, necessitates the consideration
of factors involving the impact of the parody upon the reputation of the
Arts. This approach also requires inquiry into the potential effect of the
parody upon the specific work that is copied and upon other works
having the same characteristics. Whether the parody merely defames
these works or whether there is an attempt to offer actual criticism or
advice is a vital determination. In this connection, however, care must
be taken to divorce oneself from a determination as to the soundness of
the advice or criticism. 5 Failure to make this distinction would result
in a possible repression of unpopular views.
83. The intangible nature of this intent is recognized. However, formulation of the
issue in terms of this concept is necessary because of the intangible characteristics of
"art."
84. This factor has been suggested as determinative of the issue. Such a position,
however, appears to be an oversimplification of the problem. See Note, 17 CLEV.
MAR. L. REv. 242 (1968).
85. The need for an objective determination is clear. Note that the court in the
Berlin case recognized this need-it held in favor of the parody even though the court
expressed little sympathy for the type of humor that was involved. 329 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1964).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1968], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss1/3
52 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The second consideration in calculating the impact of the individual
parody upon the Arts is the loss that might occur if the work is sup-
pressed. In this connection, factors such as the general appeal of the
parody have no relevance. Rather, it must be determined whether the
parody has meaning and whether the work will conceivably make a
contribution to a spectrum of thought.
Intent of the Parodist
Although there is a basic right to pursue one's own goals and
ambitions, there is clearly no right to intentionally harm another person.
Accordingly, the existence or absence of an intent to injure the copy-
right holder is a relevant factor in determining the extent to which the
parodist's right should be recognized.8"
This intent to injure the author may take many forms. Each form
must be measured according to its acceptability to society and the intent
weighed in proportion to this measurement. Accordingly, an intent to
harm the author by pointing to basic flaws in his style would resemble
pure criticism and involve little negative effect upon the parodist's
position. On the other hand, an intention to defame the author's reputa-
tion would clearly involve great adverse effect.
Located between the two suggested extremes are those situations in
which the parodist intends to work financial injury to the author. Such
situations are distinguished according to the manner in which the
parodist attempts to work this financial harm. Clearly, a harsh criticism
of the original may involve a desire to limit the circulation of the work.
This intent, however, appears to involve few negative implications. On
the other hand, an intent to injure financially by fulfilling the demand
for the original involves a high degree of unfairness and consequential
adverse effects upon the parodist's position."
Actual Effect of Enforcing the Copyright
The right to free access to material varies according to the need
for that material. Clearly, the parodist will have difficulty in pursuing a
claim of free access to material that is unnecessary for his parody. The
measurement of this need involves the consideration of two secondary
factors.
In many cases, the parody will be directed toward the specific
parodized work. In those instances it cannot be denied that the parodist
must have access to portions of that work. However, the parody may
be directed toward a general writing style or some other methodology
86. See Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
87. This intention was called "bad faith" by the court in the Hill case.
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in wide use. In such instances, the existence of readily available, sub-
stitute examples of the methodology has a substantial impact upon the
parodist's right to use the work in question. The extent of this impact
will, in turn, depend upon the equality of the substitutes with the
original. Determinations as to the relative acceptance of the two works
and their relative importance must be made."8
The factor of "need" has a second dimension. This involves a de-
termination of the extent to which the parodist reaches or exceeds the
amount of material necessary to create an effective parody. Certainly,
the parodist's claim to a right to use the material is substantially af-
fected by the extent to which he has fulfilled this need with other
material. In this connection, it should be noted that the parodist must
at least be allowed to copy enough material to "conjure up" the original
without experiencing negative implications.
Copyright Holder's Right
Unlike the parodist's "free access" right, the right of the copyright
holder is based upon a statute. Accordingly, the force of this right will
vary in proportion to the extent to which the position urged by the
holder corresponds to the purposes of the statute.
Briefly, the copyright statute is intended to promote the advance-
ment of the Arts. The chosen method to attain this goal is the creation
of an exclusive right to control reproduction of the work. In turn, this
exclusive right promotes the Arts by securing a financial reward for the
artist and assuring that his work will not be used in a manner that is
contrary to his wishes.
The extent to which the position taken by the holder corresponds
to the basic purpose of the statute is the crucial determination in
assessing the impact of this position. Presumably, the correspondence
with this basic purpose will be reflected and may be measured by the
correspondence to the full implementation of the means chosen to pro-
mote the Arts.
Most of the factors involved in the assessment of the strength of the
copyright holder's position are the complements of the factors involved
in the assessment of the parodist's position. Accordingly, a repetition of
the considerations involved is unnecessary.
An additional factor, however, must be emphasized. The copyright
statute is designed and intended to protect and promote the Arts, not to
foster commercial or financial interests. Accordingly, where it is neces-
88. The lower court in the Benny case referred to the availability of substitutes.
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). However, the court did not mention the equality factor
or the parodist's specific purpose.
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sary, a commercial interest must give way to the interest in promoting
the Arts. This applies equally to the parodist's right and to the rights of
the copyright holder. It should be recognized that the copyright holder's
financial interest is not an end in itself. It exists and has meaning only
to the extent that it serves the over-all purpose of the copyright law. 9
The Impact of Dominant Commercial Motivations
One court, when confronted with the parody-infringement problem
in the context of a television parody of a motion picture, categorized its
problem as one of balancing the interests of two industries." This
categorization of the problem illustrates the potential impact of dominant
commercial motives.
The above-mentioned categorization was made in the context of a
situation involving a dominant commercial motivation in the production
of both works. This dual presence of the commercial motive reduced the
strength of each side of the issue and, consequently, did nothing to aid
the resolution of the basic conflict. However, where only one of the
works under consideration was produced with dominating commercial
motivations, this factor may have a critical impact upon the final
determination.
The dominance of commercial motives is less decisive, perhaps, when
it appears as a motivation of the original work. In such situations, this
factor calls into question the necessity of full enforcement of the copy-
right as a factor in the achievement of the ultimate purposes of the
copyright laws. The protection of the specific, commercially-oriented
work may have little persuasiveness when compared to the beneficial
effect upon the parody. It may be argued, however, that the goals of the
copyright statute are furthered by protecting the commercial work inas-
much as the distinction between a commercial work and an artistic work
may be unrecognizable and protection of both will encourage the work
of the artist.
If the parody was motivated by a dominant commercial purpose,
the effect is more decisive. The dominance of the commercial factor calls
into question the status of the parody as "art." If the commercial goal
is primary, there would appear to be difficulty in proving the existence
of the requisite "artistic intention." Further, if the parody is not "art,"
there would appear to be difficulty in proving that the purpose of promot-
ing the Arts would be frustrated by restricting the parody.
89. This factor was mentioned in passing by the court in the Berlin case. 329 F.2d
541 (2d Cir. 1964).
90. Columbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
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The impact of the commercial motivation is heightened by the
fact that, in our modern society, the commercial motivation is virtually
universal. Further, experience indicates that the parody-infringement
problem will most often be presented in the context of copying within
the mass entertainment media. It cannot be denied that these media
involve a high degree of commercial motivation.
CONCLUSION
This paper has not attempted to impose a concrete solution upon
a variable problem. That the previous attempts to develop an all-
encompassing solution to the parody-infringement problem were in-
appropriate is indicated by the variable nature of the issues involved in
the determination of these questions. This changeable nature indicates
that a meaningful solution can be developed only upon a case-by-case
consideration.
If the case-by-case approach to the parody-infringement problem
is to have any rational basis, it is imperative that the various issues
involved be identified and considered. This paper has attempted to isolate
and discuss some of the major factors that might have relevance in a
consideration of the problem. The relative importance of any of these
factors will vary according to the individual facts of the case. 1 The
measurement of this importance must, of course, be left for individual
analysis and determination.
91. Note that a number of the factors isolated by this analysis are similar to the
"rules" suggested by the courts. The primary distinction, of course, is in the determina-
tive weight accorded to these factors by the courts as compared to the weighing process
suggested in this paper.
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